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Post-Partnership Strategies for Defining Corporate Responsibility: 
The Business Social Compliance Initiative 
Abstract 
While cross-sectoral partnerships are frequently presented as a way to achieve sustainable 
development, some corporations that first tried using the strategy are now changing 
direction. Growing tired of what are, in their eyes, inefficient and unproductive cross-
sectoral partnerships, firms are starting to form post-cross-sectoral partnerships (‘post-
partnerships’) open exclusively to corporations. This paper examines one such post-
partnership project, the Business Social Compliance Initiative, to analyse the possibility 
of post-partnerships establishing stable definitions of ‘corporate responsibility’. We do 
this by creating a theoretical framework based on actor–network theory and institutional 
theory. Using this framework, we show that post-partnerships suffer from the paradox of 
striving to marginalise those stakeholders whose support they need for establishing stable 
definitions of ‘corporate responsibility’ . We conclude by discussing whether or not post-
partnership strategies, despite this paradox, can be expected to establish stable definitions 
of ‘corporate responsibility’ . 
 
Keywords: actor–network theory (ANT), Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), 
codes of conduct, corporate responsibility, garment industry, institutional theory, supplier 
relations 
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Introduction 
Cross-sectoral partnerships between governmental organisations, civil-society 
organisations (CSOs), and corporations are frequently presented as a way to achieve 
sustainable development (e.g., Hartman et al., 1999; Loza, 2004; Moody-Stuart, 2004; 
Ählström and Sjöström, 2005). This vision, on the part of both practitioners and 
academics, has led to conferences dedicated to the partnership theme (e.g., the 2004 
International Conference of the Greening of Industry Network in Hong Kong), as well as 
extensive research into particularly corporate–CSO relationships (e.g., Henriques, 2001; 
Rondinelli and London, 2003; Argenti, 2004; Hamann and Acutt, 2004; Teegen et al., 
2004; McDonald and Chrisp, 2005). However, while the partnership idea is flourishing, 
some corporations that first tried using the strategy are now changing direction. Cross-
sectoral partnerships naturally involve multiple pitfalls regarding inter-sectoral 
relationships (e.g., Zadek, 2001; Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002; Rondinelli and London, 
2003). More importantly, and less acknowledged, they also involve conflicts in terms of 
intra-sectoral relationships. As Braun and Gearhart (2004), Compa (2004), Egels-Zandén 
and Hyllman (2006), and others have shown, conflicts in relationships between two types 
of CSOs, i.e., unions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), rather than conflicts 
between CSOs and corporations often account for collapsed cross-sectoral partnerships. 
In response to these intra-sectoral conflicts between CSOs, some companies seem to have 
grown tired of what are, in their eyes, inefficient and unproductive cross-sectoral 
partnerships, and have decided to approach corporate responsibility issues single 
handedly. Historically, such an approach has been an indication of an initial immature 
corporate response to demands for more extended corporate responsibility, i.e., a pre-
partnership strategy. The limited success of this approach then led to the era of cross-
sectoral partnerships. The perceived failure of these partnerships, however, seems to have 
led some firms to return once again to single-handed approaches. However, this time such 
strategies comprise informed post-cross-sectoral partnerships strategies (‘post-
partnership’  strategies) rather than immature pre-partnership strategies.  
Based on a qualitative study of one such post-partnership project, the Business Social 
Compliance Initiative (BSCI), which aimed to define and implement ‘corporate 
responsibility’  among suppliers of (mainly European) corporations in consumer product 
industries, we analyse both the negotiations related to post-partnership projects and 
whether or not such projects can successfully establish stable definitions of ‘corporate 
responsibility’ . Here we use the label ‘corporate responsibility’  to denote both the content 
and the implementation aspects of corporate responsibility. The types of inter-
organisational negotiations leading to certain, and not other, definitions of corporate 
responsibility are poorly understood (Rowley and Berman, 2000; Newton, 2002; 
Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2006). However, it is important to develop such an 
understanding if we are to understand the struggles that precede the establishment of 
definitions of ‘corporate responsibility’ , definitions that eventually come to be taken for 
granted.  
To analyse these inter-organisational negotiations connected with post-partnership 
projects and their outcomes in terms of definitions of ‘corporate responsibility’ , we create 
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a theoretical framework based on actor–network theory (ANT) and institutional theory. 
Doing this contributes to existing research in three ways. First, it continues the 
introduction of ANT into corporate responsibility research. While in many regards 
fruitful for analysing corporate responsibility issues (in particular, the establishment of 
definitions of ‘corporate responsibility’ ), ANT has so far only rarely been used in 
corporate responsibility research (Newton, 2002; Egels, 2005; Ählström and Egels-
Zandén, 2006). Second, the developed framework contributes to ANT research by 
enriching ANT with institutional theory regarding the conferring of legitimacy in the 
establishment of definitions. Third, it also contributes to research into institutional theory 
by, on the basis of an ANT framework, showing that artefacts (such as texts and technical 
devices), in addition to human actors, can play important roles in conferring legitimacy. 
Theoretical framework 
Actor–network theory 
Actor–network theory was developed to describe the negotiations that precede the 
establishment of definitions and of taken-for-granted – in ANT parlance, ‘black-boxed’  – 
‘facts’  (e.g., Callon and Latour, 1981; Catasús, 2000; Newton, 2002). The framework has 
been applied in relation to, for example, the establishment of scientific (e.g., Latour and 
Woolgar, 1979; Law, 1994; Latour, 1999), economic (e.g., Callon, 1998a, 1998b; 
Helgesson and Kjellberg, 2004), and information system-related ‘facts’  (e.g., Mähring et 
al., 2004; Holmström and Robey, 2005; Lanzara and Morner, 2005; Norén and Ranerup, 
2005; Porsander, 2005). Despite such broad application of ANT in these organisational 
theory areas and despite recent calls for more ANT research into corporate responsibility 
(Stubbs, 2000; Newton, 2002), actor–network theory has so far only rarely been used in 
corporate responsibility research (Newton, 2002; Egels, 2005; Ählström and Egels-
Zandén, 2006). This dearth could be related to the above mentioned lack of focus in 
previous research into the inter-organisational negotiations that precede the establishment 
of definitions of corporate responsibility.  
The arguably most central concept in ANT is translation (Callon, 1986a, 1986b). 
Translation can be defined as comprising the acts of negotiation and persuasion by which 
an actor is able to set the agenda for and – in ANT parlance – gain the authority to speak 
and act on behalf of other actors (Callon and Latour, 1981). Hence, translation occurs 
when an actor is able to persuade – in ANT parlance, enrol – another actor to accept its 
proposed definition. As multiple actors come to accept a specific definition, an actor-
network forms around the definition (Callon, 1986b). This actor-network constantly 
reproduces the definition, defending it from competing definitions proposed by other 
actors. As Clegg (1989) notes, defending a definition requires that the actors in an actor-
network constantly restrain other actors in the actor-network from becoming enrolled in 
other actor-networks supporting competing definitions. Hence, translation and enrolment 
are always three-party processes – i.e., one actor is enrolling, another actor is being 
enrolled, and one or more actor(s) fail to enrol. ANT studies focus on these struggles 
between different actors, or actor-networks, trying to enrol other actors to support their 
preferred definitions of an issue – in our case, the issue of ‘corporate responsibility’ . This 
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focus on struggles over the right to define issues has made some authors claim that ANT 
is essentially about how power is constructed in practice (Latour, 1991; Czarniawska and 
Hernes, 2005).  
Institutional theory 
Just as translation is arguably the most central concept in ANT, so legitimacy is central to 
institutional theory. The theory asserts that organisations’  ability to survive not only 
depends on their effectiveness but also on their legitimacy (e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Legitimacy can be defined as ‘a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’  (Suchman, 1995, p. 
574). In short, legitimacy can be said to be the acceptance of an organisation by its 
‘external environment’  (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer 
and Scott, 1983; Deephouse, 1996). In turn, the ‘external environment’  could be said to 
comprise an organisation’ s stakeholders (cf. Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 
1995; Rowley, 1997).  
While legitimacy is conferred by stakeholder acceptance, not all stakeholders are equally 
capable of conferring legitimacy (Meyer and Scott, 1983; Deephouse, 1996). In general, 
governmental organisations have been presented as particularly capable of conferring 
legitimacy due to their authoritative social position (e.g., Meyer and Scott, 1983; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Baum and Oliver, 1991). Additionally, and more specifically in 
relation to corporate responsibility issues, we believe that large, well-known NGOs 
comprise a second such influential stakeholder group, thanks to their influence on public 
opinion (cf. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983; Boli and Thomas, 1999; 
Egels-Zandén and Kallifatides, 2006). Finally, it is also reasonable to assume that labour 
unions comprise a third influential group, at least in relation to workers’  rights (the focus 
of this paper), due to their historically central position in workers’  rights negotiations 
(e.g., Weston and Lucio, 1998; Piazza, 2002; Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Frundt, 2004). 
If this reasoning regarding legitimacy is applied to the establishment of definitions of 
‘corporate responsibility’ , it becomes clear that such definitions will only become 
accepted, i.e., be stable over time, if they are perceived as legitimate by those 
stakeholders able to confer legitimacy on the definition. The concept of ‘stakeholder’  is 
here, as applied to the establishment of definitions, conceptualised as stakeholders to the 
corporate responsibility definition. Hence, as in research into actor-network theory, and 
as a first step in linking the two theoretical frameworks, the corporate responsibility 
definition is itself treated as an ‘actor’  capable of having stakeholders (cf. Callon, 1991; 
Latour, 1991; Star, 1991).  
Method 
To explore how corporations using post-partnership strategies try to create legitimacy for 
their proposed definitions of corporate responsibility, and to determine whether or not 
these efforts seem to be successful, we make use of material drawn from a qualitative 
study of the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI). The BSCI is only open to 
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(mainly European) corporations, and aims at developing and implementing a code of 
conduct regarding workers’  rights at the involved companies’  suppliers, i.e., it aims at 
defining the buying corporations’  responsibility for their suppliers’  operations. Our 
reliance on a qualitative method for studying the BSCI is well in line with previous actor-
network theory studies (e.g., Callon 1986a, 1986b; Palmås, 2005), and with studies 
attempting to combine ANT and institutional theory (e.g., Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996; 
Déjean et al., 2004).  
The data for the study were collected from written documentation (e.g., websites, official 
policies, presentations, newspaper articles, and published BSCI documents) and semi-
structured interviews (lasting on average one and a half hours each). Between 2004 and 
2006, we conducted 23 interviews with representatives of organisations involved in, or 
related to, the BSCI. All those interviewed were responsible for BSCI-related and/or code 
of conduct-related matters at their organisations, and personally had direct or indirect 
contact with the BSCI. The interviewed organisations consisted of: i) companies involved 
in the BSCI (e.g., KappAhl, Lindex, and JC), ii) companies proactive in terms of codes of 
conduct but not involved in the BSCI (e.g., H&M and Indiska), iii) NGOs involved in 
workers’  rights (e.g., the Swedish Clean Clothes Campaign, Fair Trade Center, and 
SwedWatch), iv) labour unions (e.g., the Commercial Employees’  Union and the 
Industrial Workers’  Union), and v) BSCI representatives (e.g., the project manager). The 
interviews focused on the positions of interviewees’  organisations regarding the 
suggested BSCI code of conduct and monitoring system, the processes leading up to this 
code and monitoring, and the long-term survival ability of the BSCI. The collected 
written documentation was then mainly used to validate the information obtained in 
interview, revealing few inconsistencies. 
After data collection, the data were coded by the two authors so as both to 
chronologically represent BSCI development and to categorise each organisation’ s 
position regarding the BSCI, its code of conduct, and suggested monitoring. These 
descriptions were then sent to most of the interviewees for validation. Few changes were 
suggested by the interviewees, and all changes were incorporated into the final case 
description. 
The collected data clearly focus on Swedish garment retailers and organisations, all 
interviewed corporations being garment retailers, and only the BSCI project manager 
representing a non-Swedish based organisation. This focus was chosen since – as shown 
in more detail below – for Swedish garment retailers the BSCI represents a post-
partnership strategy following eras of pre-partnership and cross-sectoral partnership 
strategies. Other firms might, of course, have joined the BSCI for other reasons, for 
example, as a first attempt to deal with ‘corporate responsibility’  issues. Nevertheless, 
this paper treats the BSCI as a post-partnership project, an interpretation supported by the 
fact that the Swedish garment retailers were highly active in the formation of BSCI. The 
working methods of Swedish garment retailers are similar to those of international 
garment retailers, and to those of Swedish and international retailers in related consumer 
product industries, with codes of conduct and monitoring systems (cf. Frenkel, 2001; 
Murphy and Mathew, 2001; van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Graafland, 2002; Sethi, 2002; 
Winstanley et al., 2002; Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2006; Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 
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2006). Given this and the fact that most BSCI members are garment retailers (particularly 
those involved in BSCI from its inception), we believe that the study presents relevant 
insights into post-partnerships, not only from a Swedish, but also from at least a 
European perspective. 
The Business Social Compliance Initiative 
Setting the scene: from cross-sectoral partnerships to post-partnerships 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, European and US corporations offshored and outsourced 
much of their production to developing countries (e.g., Jones, 2005; Taylor, 2005). This 
was particularly the case in low-skill industries, such as the garment, footwear, and toy 
industries (e.g., Christerson and Appelbaum, 1995; Hathcote and Nam, 1999). While this 
strategy did succeed in lowering costs, working conditions were often poorer in these 
developing countries than in the countries where production had previously been located 
(cf. Chan and Senser, 1997; Chan, 1998, 2000; Lee, 1998, 1999). This led to extensive 
criticism from NGOs and unions based on the notion that production, but not 
responsibility, could be outsourced and offshored (van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Roberts, 
2003; Frenkel and Kim, 2004). After being the subject of media exposés, Levi’ s was the 
first company to react to this criticism by adopting a code of conduct for its suppliers’  
operations (e.g., Zadek, 2001), and most other large consumer product companies 
eventually followed suit (e.g., Braun and Geerhart, 2004).  
 
In Sweden, companies were able to avoid criticism until the mid 1990s, when the 
Swedish Clean Clothes Campaign (SCCC) was launched. Initially, Swedish garment 
retailers (the first targets of SCCC campaigns) resisted pressures for an extended 
definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ , but continuous media exposés and the loss of 
legitimacy in the eyes of consumers made them alter their position and adopt a pre-
partnership strategy, i.e., they attempted, single-handedly, to define ‘corporate 
responsibility’ .1 It quickly became apparent that Swedish unions and NGOs were 
unsatisfied with such unilateral solutions, and, in 1999, four of the largest Swedish 
garment retailers (H&M, Lindex, KappAhl, and Indiska) joined and helped finance a 
cross-sectoral partnership. The project, later known as ‘DressCode’ , represented 
collaboration between a dozen NGOs, a handful of unions, and the four firms. Despite 
initially promising progress, the project collapsed in 2002, after three years and three 
million SEK, without any concrete results. The collapse resulted from the withdrawal of 
union support from the project, which was related to conflict between the NGO-promoted 
code of conduct and the union-promoted global agreement approaches to the problem 
(Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2006; Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2006).  
 
Simultaneously with the collapse of the cross-sectoral project, ‘DressCode’ , in 2002, the 
Brussels-based Foreign Trade Association (FTA) launched the Business Social 
Compliance Initiative (BSCI).2 In contrast to ‘DressCode’ , the BSCI was a partnership 
project open exclusively to corporations. The only role for NGOs and unions was 
potentially through the BSCI ‘Advisory Council’ , which was only allowed to advise the 
member firms, and hence, had no direct influence on the project. While different firms 
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likely had different reasons for joining the BSCI, Swedish garment retailers (both those 
directly involved in ‘DressCode’  and those carefully following its development) regarded 
the project as a potential strategy for defining ‘corporate responsibility’  without NGO and 
union involvement – i.e., to them the BSCI represented a post-partnership opportunity. 
Several Swedish garment retailers also decided to join this project, and explicitly stated 
that their decision was greatly influenced by the fact that the BSCI was corporation 
driven. Hence, the retailers perceived BSCI as more likely to create what they regarded as 
a desirable, stable definition of ‘corporate responsibility’  than any renewed cross-sectoral 
partnership effort would.  
Formation of the BSCI and the code of conduct 
In 2002, two Swedish garment retailers (Lindex and KappAhl), previously involved in 
the cross-sectoral DressCode project, participated in the working group initiating the 
formation of the BSCI. Following discussions in this group, it was decided that the BSCI 
should operationalise ‘corporate responsibility’  for suppliers’  operations through 
formulating a single harmonised code of conduct. The focus on codes was perceived as 
logical, given that at the time, most international MNCs had already adopted codes of 
conduct governing their own and their suppliers’  operations (cf. Schlegelmilch and 
Houston, 1989; Sethi, 1999; Guillén et al., 2002; Nijhof et al., 2003). In general, codes of 
conduct seem to be the tool for operationalising and defining corporate responsibility 
preferred by MNCs and NGOs, while unions tend to prefer global agreements (e.g., 
Gallin, 2000; Compa, 2004; Connor, 2004). Hence, BSCI’ s chosen focus on codes of 
conduct rather than global agreements can, regardless of the code’ s content, be seen as an 
attempt by the corporations participating in the BSCI to steer the definition of ‘corporate 
responsibility’  in their preferred direction. 
The BSCI code of conduct is based on the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN 
conventions on children’ s rights and discrimination against women. The code of conduct 
complies with most of these conventions but do not demand stricter performance than 
that defined in them. Hence, like most codes of conduct, it defines a minimum 
performance level that constitutes ‘corporate responsibility’ . The content of BSCI’ s code 
of conduct can be understood based on the historical negotiation processes preceding the 
BSCI project. As the BSCI manager notes, nowadays MNC codes of conduct are all 
highly similar (cf. Carasco and Singh, 2003; Kaptein, 2004). Hence, what comprises 
‘suitable’  content of a code of conduct, itself a subquestion of what comprises a ‘suitable’  
definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ , seems to have become, in ANT parlance, ‘black-
boxed’ , or in institutional theory wording, ‘taken for granted’ , prior to the BSCI post-
partnership project. This ‘taken-for-grantedness’  expressed itself in our study in that all 
BSCI corporate members, non-BSCI corporations, unions, and NGOs were overall 
satisfied with the content of the code.  
The most significant difference between the interviewed actors’  perceptions of the BSCI 
code was that unions and NGOs felt that the code should include ‘living wages’ , while 
the corporations, and the BSCI’ s actual code of conduct, opted for ‘minimum wages’ .3 
The debate between ‘living’  and ‘minimum’  wages is an old and contentious one in both 
Swedish and international code of conduct discussions (cf. Braun and Gearhart, 2004; 
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Connor, 2004; Frundt, 2004; Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2006). Hence, the BSCI’ s 
focus on ‘minimum wage’  can be regarded as an effort to stabilise the definition of 
‘corporate responsibility’  in favour of BSCI members, while union and NGO criticism 
can be seen as an effort to promote a competing ‘living wage’  definition. In addition to 
the lack of ‘living wage’  requirements, the NGOs have also criticized the BSCI’ s code for 
not entailing educational requirements, i.e., for not imposing mandatory worker education 
as part of the code’ s content. Here, the firms seemed more willing to alter the BSCI code 
to accommodate the NGOs’  suggestion. 
While the interviewed NGO representatives mainly criticised the content of the BSCI’ s 
code of conduct, the unions mainly criticised the choice of approach, i.e., code of 
conduct rather than global agreements. For the unions, codes of conduct represent a 
unilateral attempt by firms to bypass unions in defining ‘corporate responsibility’ . Codes 
are perceived as mere internal policy documents having little bearing on the corporations’  
social relations. Rather than codes, the unions advocate legally binding global agreements 
negotiated between firms and unions. However, BSCI members have consistently 
rejected this alternative tool for operationalising ‘corporate responsibility’ . Given that the 
BSCI strives to be exclusively for corporations, this choice seems rational, since adopting 
global agreements would change the BSCI from a post-partnership into a cross-sectoral 
partnership project. 
The BSCI’s proposed monitoring 
As well as a common code of conduct, the BSCI has also developed a common 
monitoring system for all its members. The core idea is to move from being a buyer- to a 
supplier-driven monitoring system. Rather than all buyers having to monitor all their 
suppliers, in practice leading to several buyers monitoring the same supplier, the BSCI 
system aims to synchronise the monitoring, making only one audit per supplier necessary. 
The results of the audits will then be entered into a common database, in which the BSCI 
members can search for information regarding their current and/or future suppliers. By 
reducing the number of controls on each supplier, the BSCI members envision lowered 
monitoring costs for each member. While simple in theory, this monitoring idea 
comprises a fundamental transparency shift among the involved firms. Previously, 
retailers have seldom or never shared such important information regarding suppliers 
with their competitors. Hence, a consequence of the BSCI attempt to define ‘corporate 
responsibility’  is that stronger alliances between European retailers are being created.  
BSCI monitoring is to be conducted by external auditors accredited by Social 
Accountability International (which created the SA8000 standard). Some BSCI members 
refer to these auditors as ‘independent’ , since there is no direct relationship between the 
retailers purchasing the audits and the auditors. Some even claim that BSCI audits are 
more ‘independent’  than those performed by unions and NGOs, since NGO and union 
audits are dependent on these organisations. On the other hand, the interviewed union and 
NGO representatives argued that proposed BSCI monitoring is not ‘independent’ , and 
that union- and/or NGO-led monitoring is necessary for ‘independence’ . Unions and 
NGOs seem to have limited trust in external audits purchased by retailers and often 
produced by multinational consultancy agencies. Hence, as noted in previous research 
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into code of conduct monitoring (cf. O’ Rourke, 2003), the question of who should 
conduct audits and what is to constitute independence are central matters in BSCI 
negotiations concerning the definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ . Hence, the proposed 
BSCI monitoring system can be regarded as a corporate effort to define ‘corporate 
responsibility’  in a way that minimises the role of unions and NGOs. However, the 
unions and NGOs seem reluctant to accept this assigned minimised role, and are 
consequently challenging the proposed BSCI monitoring system. 
While NGOs and unions were critical of the proposed monitoring system because of its 
perceived questionable ‘independence’ , they were also critical of the fact it was based on 
announced and official interviews. As noted in previous research into codes of conduct 
(O’ Rourke, 1997; Doig and Wilson, 1998; Frenkel and Scott, 2002; Graafland, 2002; 
Healy and Iles, 2002; O’ Rourke, 2002; Winstanley et al., 2002; Hemphill, 2004), the 
interviewees were concerned that such monitoring practices were incapable of identifying 
breaches to a code of conduct, since suppliers can deceive auditors using announced and 
official interviews. In comparison, BSCI members and the interviewed non-BSCI 
corporations were more optimistic concerning these monitoring methods, while still 
recognising the potential for deception.  
Another controversial aspect of the proposed BSCI monitoring system is the audit 
frequency. The BSCI has proposed that each supplier is to be monitored every three 
years, provided no adverse remarks were made in the previous audit. The audit frequency 
was discussed in the initial phases of the BSCI project. While auditing more frequently 
than every three years was perceived as likely to ensure higher compliance rates, BSCI 
members felt this would be too costly. However, all interviewed NGO representatives 
were highly critical of this, from their perspective, too infrequent auditing; they argued 
that it would provide too much latitude for the deterioration of working conditions during 
the years without audits.  
In sum, BSCI members argued that they had developed an independent and cost-efficient 
monitoring system that would secure compliance with the BSCI code of conduct. 
However, the unions and NGOs argued that the proposed BSCI monitoring system was 
no more credible than infrequent corporate-directed internal audits. Furthermore, the 
interviewees were highly critical of such internal systems, claiming that they provided 
inadequate information regarding suppliers’  code of conduct compliance, and hence were 
insufficient for successfully implementing codes of conduct. 
Involvement of NGOs and unions 
NGO and union involvement in the BSCI is restricted to participation in its Advisory 
Council. This council was envisioned as representing the interests of the BSCI’ s major 
stakeholders, such as unions, NGOs, suppliers, import and export business associations, 
the European Commission, the ILO, and the UN Global Compact. Hence, BSCI members 
have designed the Advisory Council to be a forum of all its major stakeholders – not only 
unions and NGOs. The council convenes twice a year to advise BSCI members on how to 
define and implement ‘corporate responsibility’  at the factories of BSCI members’  
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suppliers. As the label ‘advisory’  implies, the council has no direct influence on BSCI 
decision making, other than offering convincing arguments.  
The conducted interviews show that the Advisory Council is envisioned by BSCI 
members as serving an important function. It is envisioned as representing both a forum 
for union and NGO participation, and an opportunity for these organisations to criticise 
the project. The vision seems to be that, through such involvement and possibility of 
expressing criticism, unions and NGOs will come to accept and support the proposed 
BSCI definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ . In practice, this vision is apparently far 
from being realised. So far, few, if any, unions or NGOs have participated in the 
Advisory Council meetings. The union and NGO representatives explain their lack of 
involvement by referring to the Advisory Council as a ‘hostage’  role, i.e., they perceive 
participation in the Advisory Council as signalling implied support of the BSCI project 
without offering any direct influence on the decision making processes. As a condition 
for participation, some unions and NGOs have demanded that the BSCI’ s Advisory 
Council be given the right of veto over the decision making processes, which would turn 
the BSCI from a post-partnership project into a cross-sectoral partnership project. 
However, BSCI members have dismissed the veto argument, leading to an apparent 
deadlock, with unions and NGOs refusing to participate under the post-partnership terms 
and firms refusing to turn the BSCI into a cross-sectoral partnership. Important networks 
of unions and NGOs, such as the Clean Clothes Campaigns, have even actively advised 
their members not to join the BSCI Advisory Council. Some of the interviewed non-
BSCI involved corporations claim that this adversary relationship between the BSCI and 
unions and NGOs is one reason for not joining the BSCI, since they perceive there to be 
credibility risks associated with joining a project that lacks both union and NGO support. 
In sum, attempts of BSCI members to include unions and NGOs in the project, through 
the BSCI Advisory Council, seem to have been unsuccessful. Unions and NGOs have 
declined to participate under the corporations’  defined conditions. In turn, BSCI members 
have been unwilling either to alter the authority of the Advisory Council or to create 
alternative ways for unions and NGOs to influence the project. All in all, this has led 
unions and NGOs to criticise the project, not only regarding its proposed code of conduct 
and monitoring system, but also its decision making processes, i.e., unions and NGOs are 
critical of the BSCI’ s post-partnership structure. 
The post-partnership paradox 
Post-partnerships: an attempt to renegotiate roles 
The BSCI study illustrates an important aspect of post-partnerships – namely that they 
serve to renegotiate the roles of unions, NGOs, and corporations in defining ‘corporate 
responsibility’ . During the pre-partnership era, corporations were both uninformed about 
issues of corporate responsibility and often acted in isolation. This made them easy 
targets for coalitions of unions and NGOs (such as the Clean Clothes Campaigns), and 
these coalitions were largely able to dictate the definitions of corporate responsibility to 
be used (Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2006). In the cross-sectoral partnership era, firms 
started to become more knowledgeable about corporate responsibility issues, and were 
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able to participate more actively in negotiations regarding the definition of their 
responsibility. Still, in these partnerships, NGOs and unions retained a veto and the 
possibility of resigning from the partnership. For example, in the cross-sectoral 
‘DressCode’  project, first the unions and then the NGOs decided to withdraw their 
support, leaving the project without any tangible output despite the firms’  expressed 
wishes to continue it. Hence, in both pre-partnerships and cross-sectoral partnerships, 
NGOs and unions are in an influential position to define ‘corporate responsibility’ . 
However, in post-partnerships this situation has changed. In post-partnerships, NGOs and 
unions are forced into becoming spectators of the definition processes. In the BSCI, they 
are only invited to the Advisory Council, and, as NGOs and unions note, this is mainly a 
‘hostage’  role offering no direct influence on the definition processes. Hence, post-
partnerships (like pre-partnerships) represent an attempt by firms to gain control of how 
their responsibility is defined. However, the differences between pre-partnerships and 
post-partnerships are that: i) the firms are more knowledgeable in post-partnerships, i.e., 
it is more difficult for NGOs and unions to use their knowledge advantage to direct the 
definition processes, and ii) the firms are joining partnerships together with other firms 
rather than acting in isolation. In actor-network theory terms, as firms start to create post-
partnership projects, they are creating actor-networks around their desired definition 
processes (Callon, 1986a, 1986b). In this respect, the BSCI is unique; rarely, if ever, have 
so many European retailers collaborated regarding what is, from a business perspective, 
such a sensitive issue. Hence, post-partnerships can be seen as an attempt by firms to 
counterbalance the powerful actor-networks formed by unions and NGOs (such as the 
Clean Clothes Campaigns) by organising themselves into equally powerful actor-
networks. By then leveraging the strength of these actor-networks, the firms are trying to 
renegotiate their responsibility as comprising, for example, codes of conduct rather than 
global agreements, ‘minimum’  rather than ‘living’  wages, external Social Accountability 
International-certified auditors rather than NGO and/or union auditors, and three-year 
rather than more frequent auditing intervals. However, as shown in the next section, this 
attempt to mobilise a corporate actor-network while marginalising the union–NGO actor-
networks seemingly entails a problematic paradox. 
Legitimacy: a missing link in actor–network theory 
While actor–network theory is helpful for describing the negotiations that precede the 
definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ , i.e., the formation of, and conflicts between, 
actor-networks, it is less useful for explaining whether or not corporate post-partnership 
strategies can be expected to successfully establish stable definitions of ‘corporate 
responsibility’ . As Yearly (2005) notes, actor−network theory provides limited insight 
into when an actor-network can be expected to successfully establish a stable definition 
and when it cannot. Therefore, we argue that ANT benefits from linkages to institutional 
theory regarding the conferring of legitimacy.  
Legitimacy is a central aspect in the studied processes of defining corporate 
responsibility. To understand why this is so, we need to understand why corporations in 
the mid 1990s embraced an extended sense of ‘corporate responsibility’ , adopted codes of 
conduct, and later joined the BSCI. In turn, this is related to the distribution of power 
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along the value chain in low-skill industries (such as the garment, footwear, and toy 
industries). In these industries, with their low investment thresholds and requiring low-
skilled employees, almost all power is located at the buyer end of the chain (i.e., the 
corporations in the BSCI), since suppliers operate under conditions of fierce competition, 
while there are high entry barriers on the retailer end of the value chain (Gereffi, 1994; 
Traub-Werner and Cravey, 2002). Hence, suppliers and the workers in their factories 
have limited opportunities to demand alterations to workers’  rights – at least if such 
alterations would increase production costs, which they tend to do (cf. Lee and Lim, 
2001; Liew, 2001; Cooney et al., 2002; Cooke, 2004). Consequently, the reason for 
corporations extending their ‘corporate responsibility’  was not − and still we believe is 
not − to secure access to products or to do the ‘right’  thing (although this certainly could 
be seen as a positive side effect), but rather to gain and repair their legitimacy in the eyes 
of consumers. 
As described in the empirical section above and as has been noted in previous research 
(e.g., van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Roberts, 2003; Frenkel and Kim, 2004), corporations’  
legitimacy was tarnished by union and NGO criticism of their lack of responsibility for 
workers’  rights at their suppliers’  factories. Herein lies the apparent paradox in post-
partnership projects. The very organisations that had tarnished the firms’  legitimacy in 
the first place and that are able to confer legitimacy in relation to corporate responsibility, 
i.e., governmental organisations, NGOs, and unions, are, in post-partnerships, excluded 
from the processes intended to create new and stable definitions of ‘corporate 
responsibility’  and to restore corporate legitimacy. Hence, those whose support is needed 
for the creation of stable definitions of ‘corporate responsibility’  are marginalised in the 
definition processes by, for example, only being invited to join an Advisory Council. The 
important question then becomes whether or not the firms, despite this paradox, seem to 
be able to enrol NGOs, unions, and governmental organisations, i.e., those actors able to 
confer the necessary legitimacy on the definition, to support the firms’  proposed 
definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ .  
Starting with governmental organisations, these organisations do not seem to be enrolled 
in the studied processes of defining ‘corporate responsibility’ . Hence, the studied 
processes can be characterised as instances of ‘governance without government’  (cf. 
Beck, 1992; Rosenau, 1992; Strange, 1996), in which non-governmental actors attempt to 
stabilise definitions of responsibility without the direct involvement of governmental 
organisations. The lack of direct governmental support means that the suggested BSCI 
definition of corporate responsibility needs to be seen as acceptable to its other influential 
stakeholder groups, i.e., NGOs and unions, in order to be perceived as legitimate.  
However, the study’ s results provide clear indications of the opposite. The influential 
unions, NGOs, and coalitions (such as the Clean Clothes Campaigns) are highly critical 
of both the suggested BSCI code of conduct and monitoring system (i.e., the firms’  
proposed definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ ) and the firms’  post-partnership strategy. 
This is, for example, illustrated by the fact that no unions or NGOs have yet to join the 
BSCI Advisory Council, and that some influential coalitions, such as the Swedish Clean 
Clothes Campaign, even advised its members not to join the BSCI Advisory Council, 
since this risks fostering the legitimacy of the BSCI.  
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Hence, we can conclude that from an institutional theory perspective there seems to be 
little chance for post-partnership projects (at least, not for the BSCI) to establish stable 
definitions of ‘corporate responsibility’ , since post-partnership projects seem unable to 
gain support from the very stakeholders able to confer legitimacy on the definition. 
Consequently, it appears that the paradoxical nature of post-partnerships, i.e., the attempt 
to marginalise those stakeholders whose support the working definition needs, renders 
definition attempts unsuccessful – at least, as long as unions and NGOs consistently 
refuse to support the proposed definitions. If influential NGOs or unions, such as 
Amnesty International or the Red Cross, or influential coalitions, such as the Clean 
Clothes Campaigns, decide, for whatever reason, to support the BSCI’ s proposed 
definition, the situation will, of course, change. However, currently there are no 
indications of this happening. 
Artefacts: a missing link in institutional theory 
A mainly institutional theory-based interpretation of the BSCI post-partnership project 
indicates that the BSCI is unlikely to establish a stable definition of ‘corporate 
responsibility’ , due to its unsuccessful attempts to gain support from key stakeholders 
able to confer legitimacy. However, a more actor–network theory-inspired interpretation 
provides a somewhat different picture. When identifying actors able to confer legitimacy, 
institutional theory focuses on organisations and human actors, overlooking the potential 
influence of artefacts (in ANT parlance, ‘non-human actors’ ) (cf. Callon, 1991; Latour, 
1991; Star, 1991).  
From an ANT perspective, a definition’ s stakeholders can consist of both human and 
non-human actors; thus, not only can we conceptualise a definition as an ‘actor’ , we can 
also conceptualise artefacts as ‘stakeholders’ . Doing this opens up the possibility that 
artefacts could potentially constitute a fourth stakeholder group – in addition to 
governmental organisations, NGOs, and unions – also able to confer legitimacy regarding 
corporate responsibility. The influence of artefacts stems from the fact that they manifest 
the outcomes of previous negotiations between actors (Latour, 1991). As such, they 
stabilise previous agreements, making them more difficult to alter. In accordance with 
Latour (1991, p. 103), we believe that artefacts can be described as ‘society made 
durable’ . Hence, even though current generations of actors may disagree with the 
definitions that certain artefacts support, the artefacts themselves are difficult to change, 
since doing so is often costly. This reasoning is very similar to the better-known 
reasoning underlying ‘sunk costs’  or ‘technological lock-ins’ , which make it costly and 
difficult to shift from unsustainable to sustainable technical systems (e.g., Dosi, 1982; 
Sæther, 2000; Könnölä and Unruh, 2006).  
 
Regarding definitions of ‘corporate responsibility’  applicable to suppliers’  operations, 
there seem to be two types of texts that comprise key ‘artefact stakeholders’  able to 
confer legitimacy: the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and related 
conventions regarding child labour and women’ s rights) and the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (cf. Lozano and Boni, 2002; Egels-Zandén 
and Kallifatides, 2006). These texts are the result of extensive previous negotiations and 
are unlikely to be altered, no matter whether organisations such as Amnesty International, 
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the Red Cross, or the Clean Clothes Campaigns should choose to support them or not in 
the future (although such non-support currently seems highly unlikely). Hence, 
companies pursuing post-partnership strategies could enrol these texts in support of their 
proposed definition, and in doing so, gain legitimacy by convincingly claiming that their 
suggested content definition and implementation of ‘corporate responsibility’  is well in 
line with the content of these texts. They could thus achieve legitimacy for their proposed 
definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ , regardless of current union and NGO positions 
regarding their definition and post-partnership strategy.  
While in theory opening up the possibility that post-partnership projects might succeed in 
establishing stable definitions, despite the non-involvement of unions and NGOs, the 
situation seems in practice (at least in terms of the BSCI) to be less hopeful. The BSCI 
code of conduct does not incorporate all ILO and UN conventions (most notably, not 
‘living wages’ ). Furthermore, the type and frequency of monitoring called for in the BSCI 
code of conduct makes it difficult for member firms to claim that the code of conduct will 
be successfully implemented. Hence, so far, BSCI member firms seem to have been 
unsuccessful in enrolling governmental organisations, unions, NGOs, or key artefacts in 
support of their proposed definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ . Given this, few, if any, 
stakeholders are able to confer legitimacy supporting the post-partnership project. 
Concluding discussion 
In this paper we have analysed the possibility of post-partnership projects establishing 
stable definitions of ‘corporate responsibility’ . In doing so, we have argued that it is 
useful to link actor–network theory (ANT) to institutional theory. The ANT framework is 
helpful when describing the negotiations involved in post-partnerships, while less able to 
explain whether or not post-partnerships can be expected to create stable definitions. 
Therefore, we have argued that linking ANT and institutional theory would be useful for 
explaining the success or failure of post-partnerships. Based on institutional theory, we 
have identified an inherent paradox in post-partnerships: these partnerships strive to 
marginalise the very stakeholders, i.e., NGOs, unions, and governmental organisations, 
whose support they need in order to establish a legitimate, stable definition of corporate 
responsibility. However, an ANT framework highlights that we also need to complement 
institutional theory with the possibility that artefacts (such as UN and ILO conventions), 
as well as human actors, could also confer legitimacy. Hence, we propose that post-
partnerships could gain legitimacy for their proposed definition of ‘corporate 
responsibility’  by enrolling either NGOs, unions, governmental organisations, or even 
artefacts. In the studied BSCI post-partnership project, member firms have so far been 
unsuccessful in enrolling any of these four stakeholder groups. Therefore, we believe that 
the BSCI and similarly structured post-partnership projects are unlikely to produce a 
stable definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ .  
The conducted study has several implications for practitioners. For NGOs and unions, it 
illustrates that firms are becoming increasingly organised in their attempts to gain single-
handed control over the definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ . However, the study also 
shows that NGOs and unions still seem able to destabilise the firms’  proposed definitions 
− thanks to their ability to confer legitimacy, and given that they consistently criticise 
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post-partnerships such as the BSCI by, for example, refusing to join Advisory Councils. 
For corporations, the study illustrates the paradox inherent in post-partnership strategies. 
While BSCI member firms have aimed to create a stable definition of ‘corporate 
responsibility’ , there seems to be limited hope of this happening in practice. This leaves 
post-partnership projects with three ways forward. First, the entire idea of post-
partnerships could be abandoned in favour of cross-sectoral partnerships. For example, 
unions and NGOs could be given a more prominent role in the BSCI. Second, post-
partnerships could focus more exclusively on credibly implementing the standards 
prescribed in influential ‘stakeholder’  texts. For example, the BSCI could alter its code of 
conduct so as to be in line with all ILO and UN conventions, and develop a more 
extensive monitoring system. Third, the purpose of post-partnerships could be redefined. 
Rather than trying to establish stable definitions of ‘corporate responsibility’ , the 
partnerships could aim to replace internal corporate codes of conduct and monitoring. 
These are, and will be, criticised by unions and NGOs for not being ‘independent’  or 
transparent and for lacking credible sanction mechanisms. However, post-partnership 
projects, such as the BSCI, could potentially lower the cost to individual firms of 
developing codes of conduct and monitoring, while simultaneously allowing knowledge 
transfers between firms. Hence, post-partnership projects could comprise a successful 
strategy for their participating members, as long as their purpose changes from that of 
establishing a stable definition of ‘corporate responsibility’ . 
 
                                                 
1
 Regarding the lost legitimacy, see, for example, the opinion poll published in Expressen (1998-01-15), 
‘Var tredje svensk nobbar H&M’  (translated: Every third Swede is boycotting H&M). 
2
 The FTA is a non-governmental organisation representing European foreign trade interests; it strives to 
strengthen the multilateral trading system within the WTO framework and to increase free world trade. 
3
 ‘Minimum wage’  is the lowest legal salary level in a country, while ‘living wage’  is the wage level 
covering all basic needs (though who is to define this level is a matter of considerable debate). 
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